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NOTES, COMMENTS, DIGESTS
COMMENTS
Violation of Air Commerce Regulations as Defense to Infringement
Action-Application of Federal Air Traffic Rules to Intrastate Flight.[Federal] Novel employment of the Air Commerce Rules, was attempted
recently in the case of Cory v. Physical Culture Hotel.2 The defendant was
a subsidiary of the Bernarr MacFadden Foundation, Inc. In answer to an
action against it for infringement of a. copyright aerial photograph of its
health resort, it alleged that the plaintiff secured the photograph during a
flight which was in violation of the Air Traffic Rules. 3 The court became
4
involved in the usual fruitless discussion of aerial trespass but did not pass
on this problem as the evidence showed that the defendant had authorized
the flight. Even. had it been unauthorized the defense theory of illegal flight
would have been inapplicable for the court recognized that "the right asserted
by the plaintiff is the right to the exclusive use of his copyright, and illegal
acts, if any, not affecting that particular right will not bar his remedy for
infringement."5
Lawlessness of the plaintiff is not always a sufficient defense to his
charges. As was stated in an earlier infringement case, "it is not sufficient
to debar a suitor from relief that he has committed an unlawful act, unless
that unlawful act affects the matter in litigation.' 6 Not only must the violation affect the matter in litigation, but to be used as a defense the statute or
ordinance violated "must have been enacted for the benefit of the party who
seeks to invoke its violation as distinguished from the public generally, or a
class to whom the ordinance necessarily applies." 7 The absence of these
factors in the Cory case make the alleged violation of the Air Commerce
Regulations a mistaken defense to the infringement charges.
Even when such conditions are present in a case involving a statute of
ordinance the defendant is not always successful in setting up the plaintiff's
wrongdoing in bar of the action. In personal injury suits an attempts is often
made to employ such violations in establishing the defense of contributory
negligence.8 Courts have disposed of this argument by saying that the unlaw1. Promulgated under §3(e) of the Air Commerce Act of 1926.
44 STAT.
2120 (1926), 49 U. S. C. A. §173(e) (1935). This authorizes the Secretary of
Commerce to "establish air traffic rules for the navigation, protection, and
identification of aircraft, including rules as to safe altitudes of flight and rules
for the prevention of collisions between vessels and aircraft."
2. 14 F. Supp. 977 (W. D. N. Y. 1936), 1936 U. S. Aviation Rep. 16; see
Digest, 7 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 630

(1936).

3. Sections 69 and 71, prescribing minimum altitudes of flight. The current air traffic rules, and their accompanying air commerce regulations are
issued 'by the Department of Commerce in Aeronautics Bulletin No. 7, "Air
Commerce Regulations," and its supplements. At the present time these rules
and regulations are undergoing revision and codification and will be issued
shortly in a regulations manual.
Cf. J. Monroe Jolhson, "Trends in Aviation
Development," 7 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 541, 548 (1936).
4. A late case in this heated controversy Is Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport; same v. U. S. Airlines Transport Corp., 84 F. (2d) 755 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936)
1936 U. S. Aviation Rep. 1: 7 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 624 (1936).
5.
6.
7.
8.

14 F. Suip. 977, at 983.
Benley v. Tibbals, 223 Fed. 247, 252 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915).
Watts v. Montgomery Trust Co., 175 Ala. 102, 57 So. 471 (1912).
Watts v. Montgomery Trust Co., ibid.; Potter v. Gilmore, 282 Mass. 49,
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ful acts of the plaintiff were merely evidence of negligence, or that while
the violation of the statute was negligence per se, it was not the proximate
cause of the accident. 9 Similar examples of this defense theory may be found
in attempts to use a violation of outmoded Sunday laws to defeat a plaintiff's
action.' 0 While it is just that a plaintiff who violates the law should. answer
to the state or to the parties injured by him, he is entitled to the protection
of the law against the wrongful acts or culpable negligence of others. His
own unlawfulness should not vitiate his right of action except under the
rules suggested."It must be noted that the Air Commerce Regulations here involved are
administrative rules, not statutes or ordinances. State administrative regu-

lations have been held to lack the force and effect of law, and thus their
violation merely evidence of negligence.1 2 But the Air Commerce Regulations are more analogous to the rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission
than to those of a state body, because of their concern with national problems of air transport control. The rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission have been held to have the force of law in Wintersteen v. National
Cooperage & Woodenware Co.,' 3 and a violation of such rules held negligence
per se. 1 4 It is probable that a violation of the Air Commerce Rules, if
-raised in a proper case, would form the basis of a valid cause of action or
defense, being considered in the light of the Interstate Commerce Commission
cases as more than mere evidence of negligence. If violation of the altitude
limitation had been proved in the instant case Cory would have been subjected to penalties,1 5 and would have become liable to an injured person
184 N. E. 373, 87 A. L. R. 1462 (1933) ; Tennessee Central By. Co. v. Page, 153
Tenn. 84, 282 S. V. 376 (1926) ; cf. 27 I1. L. Rev. 223 (1932).
9.
Stark v. General Baking Co., 283 Mo. 396, 223 S. VW. 89 (1920).
A
preponderance of the courts usually holds such violation negligence per se,
irrespective of whether contribut6ry negligence is involved or not.
Taylor V.
Stewart, 172 N. C. 203, 90 S. E. 154 (1916)
(statute) : May Quon v. M. Furuya
Co., 81 Wash. 526, 143 P. 99 (1914)
(ordinance); Hopkins v. Droppers, 184
Visc. 400. 198 N. V. 738, 36 A. L. R. 1156 (1924) (statute).
Contra: BenighofNolan Co. v. Adcock, 194 Ind. 33, 141 N. E. 782, 29 A. L. R. 1344 (1923)
Banzhof v. Roche. 228 Mich. 36, 149 N. W. 607 (1924) ; Manard v. Sheppard,.
276 N. Y. S. 494 (1935)
(all involve ordinances).
10.
Armour & Co. v. Rose, 183 Ark. 413, 36 S. W. (2d) 70 (1931) ; Hughes
v. Atlanta Steel Co., 136 Ga. 511, 71 S. E. 778, 36 L. R. A. (N. s.) 547 (1911).
In Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Tabor, 274 S. W. 309 kTex. Clv.
App. 1925), aff'd, 283 S. W. 779 (1926), a violation of the Sunday law was
held no bar to a recovery for injuries sustained in the course of employment on
that day, on the ground that such act was merely a "condition" which did not
absolve the defendant from the result of his own negligence.
Cf. Jeneary v.
C. & I. Traction Co., 306 Il.
392, 138 N. E. 203 (1923), for use of the "condition" technique.
11.
Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry. v. Buck, 116 Ind. 566, 19 N. E.
453, 2 L. R. A. 522 (1889).
12.
Schumer v. Caplin, 241 N. Y. 346, 150 N. E. 139 (1925), Note (1926)
26 Col. L. Rev. 759.
Criticized in State v. Whitman, 196 Wise. 472, 220 N. W.
929 (1928), as giving-the administrative agency advisory power only.
13.
361 II1. 95, 197 N. E.-578 (1935).
14. Penn. Ry. Co. v. Moses, 42 Ohio App. 220, 182 N. E. 40 (1931).
But
not all rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission have the effect of a statute.
the purpose and intent of the rule and the authority granted by Congress must
be examined. By: Co. v. International Milling Co., 43 F. (2d) 93 (C. C. A. 8th,
1930). cert. denied, 51 S. Ct. 89 (1930).
15.
The present cese arose In New York where the law Incorporates certain
of the Air Commerce Regulations and provides that their violation shall constitute a misdemeanor.
N. Y. CONs. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 21, §246.
Section 11(a) of the Air Commerce Act of 1926 (44 STAT. 2120 (1926), 49 U. S. C.
A. §181 (1935) makes it unlawful, inter alia, to navigate any aircraft otherwise
than In conformity with the air traffic rules.
It is a distinct possibility that
Cory In this situation might Incur both the state and the federal penalties for
his act.
United States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377 (1922).
The Air Commerce
Regulations had been held to govern intrastate flying In New York before the
state regulations were enacted.
Herrick v. Curtiss Flying Service, Itfc., infra
note 25; and these subsequently enacted state regulations have been held fully

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
within the purview of the Air Commerce Regulations.1 6 But the defendant
here cannot clar'm such status to save himself from the consequences of his
act, as one infringing a copyright aerial photograph cannot be considered
within that class for whose benefit the minimum altitude rule was promulgated.
Usually the. Air Commerce Regulations have brought into litigation the
problem of federal control of intrastate flight, at least as far as the traffic
rules are concerned, rather than the use of the Regulations as furnishing a
cause of action or defense. To protect interstate flying and to impose safety
and uniformity of regulation upon all aeronautics, the "burden" theory of
commerce 17 has been applied to uphold federal regulation over all air traffic,
both interstate and intrastate. Uniform state laws appear unable to cope with
the problem as they cannot furnish as speedy and flexible regulation as is
required. With the tremendous growth of air commerce in the past few
years, with larger ships flying at higher speeds, uniform traffic rules are a
necessity. Recently traffic control towers were erected at Chicago, Cleveland,
and Newark and additional ones are being installed in other congested airports.16 The landing and dispatching orders issuing from these stations reach
beyond the confines of their immediate states and require the use of the Air
Commerce Regulations to govern intrastate and interstate flights alike, for the
safety of both.
The authority of the Secretary of Commerce to establish traffic rules was
not confined to the control of interstate flying. Section 67 of the Air Commerce Regulations expressly incorporates the statement of the congressional
managers accompanying the conference report on the Air Commerce Act of
1926 that the air traffic rules should apply to intrastate flight to prevent an
undue burden upon interstate and foreign air commerce. 10
This view was first adopted by the federal courts in the Neis~zonger
case 20 where it was held that intrastate flight was subject to the Air Commerce Regulations if it were necessary to protect interstate commerce. This
favorable ruling was supported by the decision in Swetland v. Curtiss Air21
ports Corp.,
where the 500 feet altitude rule was held to apply to intrastate
flight, as well as to interstate.
Incorporation of a large part of the federal rules in state regulations
as applicable as the Air Commerce Regulations, unless they become a "burden"

upon interstate commerce. People v. Katz, infra note 24. A prosecution for
violation of the Air Commerce Regulation has been reported. United States v.
Montgomery (W. D. Ky. 1930) 1931 U. S. Aviation Rep. 29, 3 JOURNAL OF AIR
LAW 320 (1932).
Cf. Albert Langeluttig, "Criminal Violation of Administrative
Regulations," 2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 151

(1931)

; Note 4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW

282 (1933).
16. Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 35 F. (2d) 761, (N. D.
Ohio 1929), 1929 U. S. Aviation Rep. 96, 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 359 (1929).
The court held that the plaintiff, injured through the frightening of his team
by the passage of an airship below the 500 feet altitude limitation imposed by
the Rules, was within the class of persons intended to be benefited by them.
17. Its relationship to aviation is amply discussed in George B. Logan,
"Interstate Commerce 'Burden Theory' Applied to Air Transportation," 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 433 (1930) ; Edward A. Harriman, "Federal and State Jurisdiction with Reference to Aircraft." 2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 299 (1931) ; Comment
3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 122 (1932).
18. Johnson, supra note 3, at 543.
19. Supra note 3.
20. Supra note 16.
21. 41 F. (2d) 929 (N. D. Ohio 1930), modified 55 F. (2d) 201 (C. C. A.
6th, 1932), 1932 U. S. Aviation Rep. 1, 83 A. L. R. 319, 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
293 (1932).
Here the intent of the state that the Air Commerce Regulations
should

apply to intrastate flying was made reasonably clear by the legislative

requirement that state regulation conform to the Air Commerce Regulations as
far as possible.
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has been a method frequently employed to obtain uniform traffic rule .22 In
a jurisdiction where this has been done it was held that the Air Commerce
Regulations were applicable to intrastate flying, 23 although independent state
regulations not so adopting the Air Commerce Regulations are of course valid,
and the state may control aviation within its borders until such regulation is
shown to be a burden upon interstate commerce. 24 Where state regulations
had not yet been established, a lower New York court held that the Air
Commerce Regulations should apply to intrastate flight. 25 To the contrary
is a Texas decision 26 that the Air Commerce Regulations cannot govern purely
intrastate flying unless the state legislature has adopted them. The latter
view was taken by the California Supreme Court in Parker v. Granger
which flatly affirmed the holding of a lower court that intrastate aeronautics
cannot be subjected to the Air Commerce Regulations. 27 This is the first
decision from the highest court of a state so limiting the Air Commerce Regulations, but in view of the necessity of modern aviation for uniform traffic
regulations it does not seem that the United States Supreme Court will hesistate to expand the burden theory to the ultimate extension of federal supervision over all air traffic, when a proper case comes before it.
RUSSELL PACKARD.*

DIGESTS
'Government Contracts-Consideration.-]United States Court of
Claims] The plaintiff airplane manufacturer brought suit for $35,571.25 on
an express contract with the defendant whereby the plaintiff had agreed for a
stipulated amount to (1) design, construct, assemble and deliver to the defendant twenty new type Martin bombing airplanes in accordance with specifications furnished by the defendant; (2) furnish and deliver a complete set
of clear and legible working, paper vandykes, and a bill of material of the
twentieth airplane. The contract further provided:
"It is understood by both parties hereto that the consideration named
in Article V hereof is not of itself sufficient to induce the Contractor to
undertake the work herein contracted for, without the possibility of addi-

tional remuneration from the Government.

It is therefore agreed that

one of the considerations of this Contract is said element of possibility
of additional remuneration, which is, at the same time, calculated to
afford every encouragement to the Contractor to expend its best efforts to
make the articles herein contracted for so superior to the contract requirements that a material contribution will thus be made to the science
22.

See

Department of Commerce, Aeronautics

Bulletin

No. 18,

"State

Aeronautical Legislation Digest and Uniform State Laws," for information on

regulatory methods of allstates: *This practice involves the constitutional question of incorporation by reference of future federal regulation.
23. Sheboygan Airways v. Industrial Commission, 209 Wise. 352, 245 N.
V. 178 (1932), 1933 U. S. Aviation Rep. 248, 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 464 (1932).
In De Votie v. Cameron, 265 N. W. 637 (Iowa 1936), 1936 U. S. Aviation Rep.
343, 7 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 419 (1936), the petition alleged that both the federal
rules and the state regulations were violated, but the question was not passed
upon as the suit was dismissed because the state was defendant in its sovereign
capacity.

24. People v. Katz, 249 N.
2 Air Law Rev. 386 (1931).
25. Herrick, Olsen et al. v.
S. C. Nassau County 1932), 1932
103 (1933).
26. English v. Miller (Tex.
OF AIR LAW 312 (1931).
27. 90 Cal. Dec. 475, 52 P.
7 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 275, 283

Y. S. 719 (1931),

1931 U. S. Aviation Rep. 1,

Curtiss Flying Service, Inc. and Byrnes (N. Y.

U. S. Aviation Rep. 110, 4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
Civ. App. 1931) 43 S. W. (2d) 642, 3 JOURNAL
(2d) 226 (1935), 1936 U. S. Aviation Rep. 251;
(1936).

0 Northwestern University School of Law.
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and art of Aviation and as a result of which the Government will consider it advisable to reproduce such articles in quantity.
The contract thereafter provided for the payment to the plaintiff of a
percentage of the price which the Government might pay for any airplanes
which it might later purchase of a similar design to those for which it was
then contracting. The plaintiff proved that the defendant contracted with
three airplane companies for the construction of additional planes which were
manufactured according to the design, plan and drawings furnished by the
plaintiff under its contract with defendant. The Government defended on the
ground that the provision of the contract failed for want of consideration.
Held: The provision for a contingent fee was supported by a valuable consideration and therefore valid. F. Jacobson & Sons v. United States, 61 C.
Cls. 420; and Cohen., Endel & Co. v. United States, 60 C. Cls. 513.
In disposing of the case the court stated:
"The facts show that the Government did consider the articles such
a material contribution to the science and art of aviation and so satisfactory that it ordered and had reproduced over 100 planes from the
design and vandykes which were furnished by the plaintiff. The very
wording of this article shows that it was a-part and parcel of the consideration of the contract, and, if it had not been agreed to, the Government would probably have had to pay a much higher price for the planes
manufactured by the plaintiff. There is no question of royalty involved.
There is no claim that the design or any part thereof was patented. The
claim is one under contract, and the Government has received the benefits
and now refuses to pay. It has been held by this court that a contingent
fee is valid where there has been a valuable consideration therefor and
the contractor has performed his part of the contract."
Airports-Zoning-Continuation of Air Meets, a Nonconforming
Use.-[Connecticut] This was an appeal from a judgment for the defendants on an action for an injunction restraining the defendants from conducting air-meets and exhibitions. It appeared that the defendant, since
1924, had been the owner of a tract of land which had been used by him
as a flying field for airplanes; a hangar was erected thereon with accommodations for five planes; and members of the public were taken for rides on the
planes quartered there, or which came on occasion for such purposes. Air-

meets were held on the property during 1928 and in the summer of 1929.
Late in October of 1933 a zoning ordinance became effective under which the
defendant's land was located in a residential zone. The ordinance contained
provisions, however, that any nonconforming use existing at the time of its
adoption might be continued but that no nonconforming use should, if once
changed into a conforming use, be changed back again into a nonconforming
use; also, that no nonconforming use should be extended so as to diminish
the extent of the conforming use. No air-meets were held on the property
during 1931 or 1932. However, since October, 1933, public air-meets were
held at which the public was charged for the parking of cars on the field
and on other land of the defendant, and concessions were let for the sale

of refreshments, etc.

The plaintiff's property comprised a large residence

with cottages and extensive grounds, plaintiff's dwelling being located about
2,000 feet from the nearest point of defendant's land.
From the facts found the lower court reached the conclusion that the
parking .of cars for which a charge- was collected since October, 1933, and
the granting of concessions for selling refreshments, etc., were new nonconforming uses violating the zoning ordinance, but that the plaintiff had
proved no damage therefrom; that before the zoning ordinance took effect
there had been an abandonment of the use of the premises for air-meets, but
that. the right to hold them thereon still existed because the property had
not been devoted to a conforming use prior to their resumption; and that

the other uses, though nonconforming, were in existence when the ordinance

took effect and their continuance was authorized by provisions therein con-
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tained. Held: The findings and the conclusions of the trial couft sustained.
Sophie G. LeImaier v. Alvin D. Wadsworth et al, 235 C. C. H. 1807 (Conn.
Sup. Ct. of Er., April 7, 1937).
On the appeal the principal efforts of the plaintiff were directed toward
establishing that the nonconforming uses prior to the taking effect of the
ordinance were not continued, within the provisions of the zoning ordinance,
but had been abandoned and succeeded by a conforming use-specifically a
development of the land for residential purposes. In denying this contention,
the court said in part:
"The temporary interruption or suspension of the nonconforming use
without substitution of a conforming one or such a definite and substantial departure from previously existing conditions and uses as to
signify an abandonment of the latter does not terminate the right to
presume them (citing cases). Even if the defendant had in mind the
possibility of a future change in use, so long as his operations had a
legitimate present purpose and utility appropriate to the existing uses
there would not be such departure from the latter as to require a finding
of a present change terminate his right to continue them
After discussing other conclusions of law reached by the trial court,
the Court of Errors pointed out that plaintiff predicated her claim for relief
solely upon violation of the zoning ordinance and expressly disclaimed
reliance upon any contention that the activities of the defendants constituted
a public nuisance inflicting damage special to her or her property. It was
therefore held that the appellant was not entitled to pursue, in the upper
court, the latter claini.
Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Evidence-Proof of Pilot's License.[C. C. A., Alaska] This was a suit by an administrator to recover damages for death sustained by the decedent in the crash of an airplane belonging to the appellee, the Pacific-Alaska Airways, Inc., in which the decedent
was riding as a passenger. On the trial the appellant proved that the plane
crashed, and rested. Appellee, to meet the prima facie case arising under
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, attempted to prove that the pilot of the plane
and the inspecting mechanic were duly licensed under the Air Commerce
Act of 1926. On the trial the appellant was permitted to ask a witness
whether he knew if the pilot held a license. Objection was made to the
question but was overruled and an exception noted; the ruling was assigned
as error. Held: Judgment reversed. M. Clifford Smith, as administrator v.
Pacific Alaska Airways, Inc. (235 C. C. H. 1218, Circuit Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit, March 29, 1937).
In concluding that the license itself would be the best evidence of the
fact that the pilot was so licensed, and that the admission of the witness'
testimony was error, the court made the following suggestion for retrial:
"Since this case must be retried, and the instruction given in the
charge to the jury on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine (toes not adequately
inform the jury of the character of proof necessary to meet a prima
facie case under this doctrine in a passenger case, it is proper for us to
say that a full discussion of the applicable rule appears in Gleeson v.
Virginia Midland R. R. Co., 140 U. S. 435; cited in Sweeney v. Irving,
228 U. S. 233, 240."
Liability-Workmen's Compensation-Scope of Employment.-[Ohio]
TLre action was brought by the widow and dependent of one Smith, who was
killed in an airplane accident during the period of his employment by The
Embry-Riddle Company which had complied with thie Ohio Workmen's
Compensation Act. The Common Pleas Court had sustained the motion
of the Industrial Commission for an instructed verdict, for the reason that
the plaintiff had failed to show jurisdiction in the Commission, i. e., injury
within the scope of employment. Smith was employed as a ground mechanic
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by the defendant company, which operated an airport and owned various types
of airplanes. His duties related to taking care of airplanes and repairing
them while they were on the giound and in moving them from one place
to another on the ground; he was not hired or permitted to fly the airplanes.
The record showed that on the morning of the accident another employee,
having similar duties to those of Smith, started the motor of the airplane
preparatory to moving it to a starting line, at which point the foreman, one
Angieri, who had no authority to operate an airplane in the air, appeared,
ordered the other employee out of the airplane, entered himself and increased
the speed of the motor preparatory to take-off. At this point Smith came
up and entered the plane. Angieri and Smith then proceeded the long way
of the field, at the usual point left the ground, turned back over the hangars
in the air, and crashed to the ground at a point near but outside the flying
field. Held: Judgment reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings according to law. Luvah M. Smith v. The Industrial Commission,
235 C. C. H.. 905 (Court of Apipeals, Hamilton Co., Ohio, February 3, 1936).
In concluding that death occurred in the course of employment, the
court stated:
"Angieri was the foreman. He had authority to direct Smith as to
repairing planes and moving them from place to place on the ground.
It was the usual time to move planes from the hangars to the starting
line. This plane had been brought out of the hangar, and its motor
started for that purpose. All the circumstances up to that point indicated
that the course of the employment was proceeding without deviation.
When Angieri entered the plane it was, to all outward appearance, just
another step in the course of the employment. And when Smith entered
and took his seat beside him, he appeared to be doing that for which
he was employed. There is no evidence indicating that Smith at the
time knew anything of Angier's intention to do otherwise than pursue
the normal tenor of the employment."
The court found that an issue was raised supported by substantial evidence, which should be submitted to the jury for its determination.

